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29 April 1981

Classification Review Procedure

CRP 81-1/OSS


HANDLING DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE REVIEWED

UNDER AN FOIA REQUEST AND WITHHELD

1. Occasionally you might encounter a classified document which has been reviewed under an FOIA request and withheld from release to the requestor. This situation can be determined by the stamp appearing on the document indicating that a review had been made giving the date of the review; the ID number of the reviewer; the classification level retained; the authority for the action; and the date for re-review. When you find such a document and concur that it remains classified, process it normally, i.e. replace it with a Withdrawal Notice, stamp it with your Systematic Classification Review stamp and fill in the stamp (you can use the 30-year re-review date if it applies regardless of the re-review date shown on the FOIA-initiated stamp), and complete a 4023A form. Do not void the FOIA-initiated stamp; your action will reinforce the earlier decision that the document remain classified.

2. If you encounter such a document and believe that it should be declassified, bring it to the attention of C/CRD/OPS before you take any action.

STAT


Chief, Classification Review Division

Classification Review ProcedureCRP 80-4/OSSPAYROLL RECORDS

The Office of Finance has requested that all OSS payroll records be withdrawn from the permanent OSS records destined for NARS. These payroll records, together with certain personnel and other administrative records, are necessary for CIA to hold because they could contribute to the establishment of the official U. S. Government record essential to the proper settlement of claims made against the OSS and aid in substantiation of U. S. Government employment. Any such payroll records, whether classified or not, should be tabbed and marked "Payroll Record." DO/IMS/ will pull these tabbed documents.

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The Office of Finance defines OSS payroll records as personnel financial records which document payments made to individuals. Payroll records are associated with the employment of OSS staff personnel, employment of personnel from other U. S. Government agencies attached to the OSS, employment of personnel of allied governments hired and used individually or in units, and indigenous personnel hired to perform various housekeeping and other support duties. Such records should identify the employee by name, show gross compensation, all deductions and net amounts paid during a specific period. Examples of payroll records which should be tagged are:

- a. Payroll cards.
- b. Records from a Station listing payments with deductions made to employees.
- c. Earnings statements.

The following types of financial records are NOT usually considered to be payroll records and therefore will not normally be tabbed:

- a. Payments made to Agents which do not show deductions.
- b. Records of advances.
- c. Financial records concerning the operation of Stations and Bases or other OSS facilities.
- d. Payments made to a project.
- e. T & A cards or their equivalent.

It is expected that not all documents in this general category will fall unreservedly within the above definition. When such a document does not clearly and neatly reflect all the desired details and yet, in the judgment of the reviewer, contains information that could contribute to satisfying a potential claim, it should also be tabbed.

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Chief, Classification Review Division

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29 January 1980

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 80-001/OSS

Replaces Paragraph 1 of CRP 79-005/OSS

HANDLING FIELD INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

STAT In a letter to the Archivist of the United States dated 16 October 1978, the Director identified "unevaluated [redacted] and field intelligence reports, accessioned as permanent records to NARS by other agencies, as containing information that requires continued protection beyond thirty years in the interest of national security." It was subsequently agreed with NARS that the cutoff date for such reports would be those dated on or after 1 January 1946. When you encounter such reports dated on or after 1 January 1946, tab them. They will be withdrawn by the Information Management Staff of the DDO before the records are accessioned to NARS.

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Chief,
Classification Review Division

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27 May 1980

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 80-6

CRP 80-3/OSS

GUIDANCE PERTAINING TO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

WITH OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE AND PREDECESSORS

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from OTS/RMPS entitled "Guidelines for Declassification of Documents Pertaining to Contractual Relationships With Office of Technical Service." The memo contains guidance from OTS which was prompted by questions raised by the OSS Review Team. It provides us with current guidance in the field of Agency and predecessor relationships with private firms and forms part of our classification review guidance.

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Chief, Classification Review Division

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12 May 1980
RMPS 33-80

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Classification Review Division

25X1 FROM :
Chief, OTS/RMPS

SUBJECT : Guidelines for Declassification of Documents
Pertaining to Contractual Relationships With
Office of Technical Service. (C)

REFERENCE : MPS 33-79, dated 7 September 1979 to Chief,
Classification Review Division, Subject:
Updated Guidelines for Declassification of
Documents of the Office of Technical Service.

25X1 1. In March of this year two members of my staff met with
 and his colleagues at Ames Building to
discuss the OTS guidelines for declassification of documents, in
particular documents relating to contractual relationships.
Examples of the type of documents in question were brought back
to OTS for review with the OTS/Contract Management Branch. (C)

2. After review of the exemplars and discussions with the
CMB Security Officer and Chief, CMB, OTS is of the opinion that
these documents require continued protection. While many of
these contractual relationships are no longer active, there are a
number of contractors from that period with whom we still do
business. In addition, through company mergers and forming of
conglomerates many of these companies are actively employed under
different names. Anyone having access to this early information
could easily, by following the growth of a company and submitting
FOIA requests, determine the nature of our present involvement
and/or interest. As stated in paragraph 2 of ref, "Although it
is true that most of the material is obsolete, it represents
first attempts or early uses of items and techniques that in post
war years were refined and improved for continuing Agency use.
(C)

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3. In view of the above, OTS information on contractual relationships with private industry, consultants, research and educational institutions (foreign and domestic) continues to meet classification requirements and requires continued protection.
(C)

4. If you have any further questions on this memorandum or any OTS material being reviewed for declassification, please contact (C)

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SECRET

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-008/OSS

GUIDELINES FOR THE HANDLING OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION FOUND IN OSS RECORDS

1. Revised National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 (NSCID No. 5) entitled "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," makes the CIA responsible for several services of common concern to the U.S. Government including "the maintenance for the benefit of the Intelligence Community of central indices and records of foreign counterintelligence information." The Directive further states that "all departments and agencies shall contribute to this index, on a continuing basis, such material collected by them as is appropriate for a central file; this material shall be collated and analyzed for appropriate dissemination." In DCID No. 5/3, the DCI directs other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to forward to the CIA for inclusion in centralized indices and repositories of foreign counterintelligence information any information on:

(A) Personnel, organization, plans and activities of foreign ministries and departments supervising intelligence and security functions and of foreign intelligence and security services, or components thereof, that engage in one of the following activities: espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, subversion, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, deception and disinformation, provocation, penetration and paramilitary operations;

(B) Personnel, plans and activities of the clandestine or illegal apparatus of foreign Communist parties, irrespective of whether these appear in direct support of international activities, national parties, front organizations, or of Trotskyist or left revolutionary groups or parties;

(C) Other organized clandestine activity not covered by (A) and (B) above directed against and having a significant bearing upon the security of the U.S. and its personnel and installations abroad. DCID No. 5/3 also states that the centralized indices and repositories of foreign counterintelligence information will be used "to service name checks and visa checks requested by other departments and agencies; provide, in consonance with intelligence objectives and priorities established by the DCI, current studies and reports on foreign intelligence and security services, including information on methods of operation and reports on foreign counterintelligence aspects of international Communism; and to produce current counterintelligence reports and in-depth studies on foreign counterintelligence subjects that would be of assistance to other departments and agencies in carrying out their assigned missions."

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SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100053-8

2. To serve these objectives this centralized repository of counter-intelligence information should be viewed as an active file containing information which may be operationally useful or provide a historical context against which to examine and analyze foreign clandestine activity. Each piece of information or document considered for inclusion in this file must pass the test of being considered relevant and useful in contributing in some way to the identification or understanding currently or historically of foreign intelligence or security services or of other groups considered capable of conducting now or in the future hostile clandestine activity inimical to U.S. interests. Normally, information about the intelligence and security services of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Tojo's Japan will not be of counterintelligence interest today, can be declassified on that basis and released to NARS. Information about the services of our allies during WW II and about our allies and countries friendly to the U.S. today, particularly those with which we maintain a liaison relationship, will be considered "liaison information" with a positive connotation. Such information will be considered counterintelligence information for our purposes and will not be released to NARS. Information concerning the intelligence elements in the groups representing the various Eastern European countries which participated on the side of the Allies in WW II will probably be in the main "liaison information" but may include personality information or characteristic intelligence methods or techniques worthy of retention as OSS CI information. Information about the intelligence and security services and activities of the Communist countries (the Soviet Union, Maoist China and Tito's Yugoslavia during the OSS period) and those aligned with them is of counterintelligence interest and should be processed in accordance with instructions in paragraph 4 and 5 below. Should we encounter information concerning a non-aligned or third-world country which today can or could develop active intelligence interest in the U.S., it would also be processed in accordance with instructions in paragraph 5 below. It is anticipated that in general, useful CI information in OSS records will consist primarily of the identification of known middle-level intelligence and security service officers who may have advanced in their service through the intervening years to leadership position or are still active in their service; especially significant or dangerous agents or other collaborators who did or might be expected to have continued working against U.S. interests; and, information about the organization and functioning of individual foreign services or groups including unusual methods or characteristic techniques which provides us with a historical context to aid our understanding of that service or group. Counterintelligence information of this type may be divided roughly into four categories: (1) Organizations and groups; (2) Personnel involved in or supporting a clandestine activity as identified above in paragraph 1(A); (3) Methods, techniques and equipment used; and, (4) Installations, safesites or other facilities. It would be very difficult to identify all the various types of counterintelligence information that might be encountered in OSS files, ~~which might qualify for the special CI file~~, but here are some types of information which might apply:

(A) Organizations and Groups - Information concerning the plans, missions, lines of responsibility, organizational data including schematics, diagrams or charts, and information concerning the sources of ideological, financial, logistical, organizational and institutional support.

(B) Personnel - Information identifying individuals known (not just suspect) to have been officers, agents, informants, collaborators of other persons involved with foreign intelligence or security services or other groups or organizations which engaged in clandestine activities inimical to U.S. interests and who were involved in one or more of the following activities: espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, and paramilitary operations including data on personnel of the illegal aparat of the Communist party.

(C) Activities and Methods - Information identifying the methods, techniques and equipment used to conduct espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, and paramilitary operations including the activities and methods used by the illegal aparat of the Communist party with special attention to those techniques and methods not exclusively applicable to wartime.

(D) Installations, Safesites and Other Facilities - Information including schematics, charts, diagrams, drawings or photographs of installations, operational sites and facilities, and details of their maintenance and use.

3. The counterintelligence organ with the OSS was X-2; X-2 records should be reviewed with special care for counterintelligence information which meets the above definitions. Keep in mind however, that not all and probably not even a majority of X-2 records will meet the criteria to be retained as currently relevant counterintelligence information. For example, X-2 was required to investigate or vet all non-U.S. personnel whether potential agents, potential support personnel, or others considered for employment or recruitment by the other branches of the OSS. As a result of this responsibility, X-2 files contain not only the name check or vetting requests for potential agent personnel but also for chauffeurs, cooks, and other non-operational personnel whose identities are not considered sensitive. The purpose of the request is clearly indicated. If in doubt, err on the side of overprotection because we do not want to identify any agents or persons who were used in other operational capacities because, should it ever appear that the CIA is releasing the identities of agents and other operational personnel it will adversely impact on our national security by hampering our future ability to recruit and retain such personnel.

4. The investigative files of X-2 will be removed from OSS records before they are sent to us for review. This will be done by a team from IMS/DDO. The investigative files are considered temporary records and will be held by the Agency until usefulness has ended and then they will be destroyed. Should reviewers find X-2 investigative files or individual investigative documents which were overlooked by the IMS/DDO team, they should be tabbed and marked as "CI" and left in the box. Preparation of a 4023A is not required.

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5. When documents are encountered and identified as containing CI information, they should be handled as follows:

(A) When the document is unclassified or can be declassified, a copy will be made for Agency files. The original will be left in the records box to be sent to NARS. If there is a cover sheet on the document which should be retained, remove it from the original and put it on the copy. The copy will be sent directly under an archival form 610 for processing. No 4023A form input is required.

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(B) When the document requires continued protection, remove it from the records box and replace it by a Withdrawal Notice. Complete a 4023A form as for any other document requiring continued classification.

6. Agency files do not have a CI category as such. However, CI information is filed in several different categories such as liaison, illegal aparat of foreign Communist parties, Soviet Bloc installations and other subversives including terrorists, narcotic traffickers, etc. When such CI information is retained by the reviewers, it is placed in the regular exempt file and thus remains available in the Agency's own file system by search through the regular index.

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Chief,
Classification Review Group

2 July 1979

Classification Review Procedure

CRP 79-32 and
CRP 79-008/OSS

GUIDELINES FOR THE REVIEW OF RECORDS FOR THE PERIOD
FROM THE END OF OSS TO THE BEGINNING OF CIA
1 October 1945 - 18 September 1947

BACKGROUND

On 20 September 1945 President Harry Truman signed an Executive Order breaking up the OSS as of 1 October 1945 and directing the Secretary of State to take the lead in developing the program for a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence system. The Research and Analysis (R&A) and Presentation Branches of the OSS went intact to the State Department. The remaining activities of the OSS (mostly clandestine services) were assigned to the War Department which was to keep them separate in the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) established by the Executive Order for that purpose and to keep those activities to serve as a nucleus for a possible central intelligence service.

On 22 January 1946 President Truman issued a Presidential Directive which established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) functioning directly under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The NIA consisted of representatives of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a personal representative of the President. The Director of CIG was appointed by the President. His duties included planning to coordinate departmental intelligence activities; recommending policies and objectives of the "national intelligence mission;" correlating and evaluating intelligence for strategic and national policy and disseminating it within the Government; performing functions related to intelligence as the President and NIA might direct; and performing services of common concern where those services could be performed more efficiently by a central organization. Significantly, the Director of CIG was not given the duty of directly collecting intelligence. The CIG was described as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity." Since the SSU had been expected only to serve an interim function, the Executive Order of 20 September 1945 directed the Secretary of War to discontinue the SSU as soon as its functions and facilities could be: 1) placed in a new central intelligence organization; 2) placed in the War Department; or 3) dropped entirely. General Magruder, Chief of the SSU, was to superintend the liquidation of those SSU activities to be dropped entirely during peacetime. On 29 January 1946 the Secretary of War directed that the SSU should be liquidated by 30 June 1946. The Director of CIG was to take what records he wanted from SSU through the Secretary of War and retain operational control over them. Title to the records was to be settled later. Magruder felt that SSU plans, properties and personnel must be maintained because they were indispensable for the procurement of intelligence in peacetime. On 14 February 1946 he urged that the SSU be placed under the Director of CIG.

As there was some dispute over whether the Director of CIG should get the entire unit, an interdepartmental committee was organized under Colonel Fortier to study this question. The committee found support for the opinion that the SSU, as was, ought not go to the CIG. The committee had heard that the bulk of intelligence information came from friendly governments; that much material came from other sources than secret collection; that SSU personnel had not been adequately screened; and that many clandestine personnel had become exposed during WW II. The committee thought that the SSU should be reorganized and the desired portion placed under the CIG as a "going concern." The committee thought that CIG should closely coordinate clandestine operations, concentrate on the USSR and the Satellites, penetrate key institutions to aid possible U.S. military operations, develop liaison with foreign intelligence agencies and develop sleeper networks in Germany and Japan while overt collection of intelligence information should remain with the other U.S. Government agencies. The committee also recognized the interrelationship between the SSU and the R&A Branch (still located in the State Department) and urged that their activities be integrated because the R&A Branch was "closely geared to the secret intelligence branches as their chief guide." The committee also felt that the Director of CIG should take authority and responsibility for liquidation of the SSU.

On 3 April 1946 the final liquidation of SSU was postponed from 30 June 1946 to 30 June 1947. Meanwhile, the Chief of SSU was directed to obey the instructions from the Director of CIG. This made it possible for Fortier, Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services of CIG, to take over such SSU assets as the Director of CIG wanted while unwanted assets would be absorbed into the War Department or abandoned. The arrangements for the transfer of SSU to the CIG through the War Department were complicated but it enabled the CIG to take legally what it wanted while Magruder, Chief of the SSU, got rid of unwanted facilities through the War Department. Although no specific legal action was taken, the passage of time and the inferential approval of the National Security Act of 1947 appears to have vested title of SSU property to the CIG.

In June 1946 General Vandenberg became the Director of CIG (replacing Admiral Souers). Vandenberg felt that the Director of CIG must be the NIA's executive officer and he immediately struck out to obtain greater authority and independence for the CIG. While his ideas met resistance from the member agencies of NIA, Vandenberg did win some points. For example, Vandenberg wanted the CIG to conduct all espionage and counter-espionage for the collection of foreign intelligence abroad. This proposal was modified to allow the Director of CIG to conduct only those "organized federal" operations which were outside the U.S. and its possessions, but still left CIG with the authority to collect intelligence information. The purpose of the revision was to permit the military services to collect intelligence for departmental purposes and it was meant to protect the FBI in performing its duties within the U.S. Vandenberg then established the Office of Special Operations to collect foreign intelligence. During the summer and fall of 1946, the CIG arranged to take over the personnel, undercover agents, and foreign stations of the SSU. By mid-October 1946 the liquidation of SSU was complete. (SSU as a bonafide organization never actually went out of business. The C/IMS/DIO is the current chief of SSU and is authorized to conduct certain business for

and on behalf of SSU. Most SSU activities involve checking out special requests from EX-SSU or OSS personnel.) Field stations were notified that effective 19 October 1946 "SSU discontinues all overseas activities and the Office of Special Operations of CIG assumes responsibility for conducting espionage and counterespionage in the field for collection of foreign intelligence information required for national security."

As noted above, the CIG takeover of the SSU stretched over a period of several months in 1946. During this period the CIG took over many of the personnel, installations, facilities and cover arrangements and units as well as administrative practices of the SSU. Thus you will find CIG, after 19 October 1946, using SSU cover unit designations and letterhead stationery from such units making it difficult to identify CIG documents from appearance alone. It could be argued that if the letterhead is SSU then it is an SSU document. Be that as it may, for general purposes in classification review consider all records created before 19 October 1946 as SSU and all records created after that date as CIG.

GUIDELINES

For our general use in the classification review process, the date of 19 October 1946 will be considered the pivotal date marking the "end" of the SSU and the "beginning" of the CIG. Generally speaking, records dated prior to 19 October 1946 will be considered SSU documents and those created after that date will be considered CIG documents.

The methods of organization and operation used by the SSU were very similar to those developed and used by the OSS. The SSU was essentially a military unit, staffed mostly by military personnel and housed in the War Department under military command. It is therefore pertinent for us to review SSU documents under those guidelines developed for and used in the classification review of OSS records. The CIG on the other hand, very soon after its creation began to take on an independent life and although many CIG personnel continued to be military it quickly attracted more civilians and it was not under direct military command. We will, therefore, look at CIG documents as relating closely to the beginnings of the CIA and will review CIG documents under those guidelines developed for and used in the classification review of CIA records. As a general rule, the OSS review team will be responsible for reviewing documents originated before 19 October 1946 and the other CRJ reviewers will be responsible for those documents originated after 19 October 1946. This date is not intended to be an absolute rule; as in all review work, individual judgement must be used. For example, a document originated after 19 October 1946 might refer to the past and to activities or problems of the SSU making it in essence a more or less typical SSU document containing material relating to the SSU. Such a document should be reviewed as being essentially a SSU document and using the OSS guidelines to judge the classification action. On the other hand, a document originated before 19 October 1946 might refer to the future and to activities or problems relating to the CIG making it in essence a more or less typical CIG document. This type document should be reviewed as a CIG document using the CIA guidelines.


All reviewers should be especially alert for these types of documents and pay particular attention to their classification review. If there is any question, coordination should be effected between the CRD Operations Branch/OSS and the CRD Operations Branch/CIA through the Chief of the CRD Operations Branch.

The major categories of information which most likely will require continued protection are: 1) information which identifies sources; 2) foreign government information and details of intelligence agreements we had with foreign governments; 3) information revealing unique intelligence methods not generally known or used and not outdated; and 4) information which could still cause negative reactions that could impact adversely on current or future U.S. foreign relations. Some more specific guidelines are as follows:

1. Protect all sources to avoid creation of a reputation that U.S. intelligence services cannot protect their sources. A rare exception to this rule might be possible where the contact was fleeting, incidental, insignificant and overt.

2. Identification as an SSU staffer will be judged and handled the same way as it is for an OSS staffer. Staffers generally will not be protected merely because they later worked for the CIG or the CIA. If however, the person engaged in sensitive work for CIG or the CIA, their SSU (and OSS) employment may be exempted from declassification to protect the later sensitive work or position in the CIG or the CIA.

3. Persons who served under non-official cover are protected at all times as is their cover.


Chief,
Classification Review Division

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Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-006/OSS

REVIEW OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

1. E.O. 12065 authorizes protection of foreign government information for up to thirty years before requiring it be reviewed for declassification under guidelines developed, where appropriate, in consultation with the foreign government concerned. The Agency position is that classified documents created by a foreign government or foreign government information, however obtained, which is used in OSS reports, may not be declassified without specific instructions from the foreign government concerned. The basis for this position is that such information and documents were given to the U.S. Government with the understanding that they would be held in confidence and, that the unauthorized or inappropriate exposure today could impact adversely on current or future U.S. liaison and diplomatic relations as well as directly on U.S. intelligence equities. These general considerations should be kept in mind when reviewing OSS records, and any given foreign government document or information should be viewed under this light. The basic requirement is to protect current and future CIA and U.S. intelligence interests. Complete guidelines which would neatly cover each and every case presented to the reviewer is not feasible. The following however, are provided to give the reviewer a more specific idea of what requires protection in the areas of sources and methods, liaison relationships, and U.S. foreign relations:

a. Sources and methods - protect the identity of agents and collaborators; informants where a serious and sustained relationship existed; include persons used jointly. Protect intelligence methods, ("theirs," "ours," or "joint") which have had continued applicability in their or our operations or would, if revealed, create a negative reaction from one of our friendly liaison services with whom we continue to cooperate, or could impact adversely on our foreign relations today or in the future. Sensitive intelligence methods are those which are not essentially identical to methods universally employed by intelligence services and therefore widely known, or that have not been rendered obsolete by technological advances.

b. Liaison relationships - consider what the liaison services' attitude and requirements are for release of their own information and records as the basis against which to consider our handling of their documents and information. All services protect their sources and we must do likewise. More difficult to judge is information concerning intelligence methods and organizational data, release of which might cause an adverse reaction that could impact negatively on our current or future relationship with that service. Identification of their personnel is certainly one such category of information that should not be generally released, organizational details another, and information that could reveal something of their methods of operation should receive careful attention.

c. Foreign relations - An even more difficult area in which to render judgments is that information which could impact adversely on current or future U.S. foreign relations. The same categories of information noted above are applicable but here we must consider the additional factor that exposure could impact adversely on current or future U.S. foreign relations. Such problems would likely revolve around prominent personalities, controversial government policies or actions, or government to government relationships considered particularly sensitive and often maintained under some measure of secrecy for that reason. These problems are more likely to arise concerning those countries which were neutral or not totally committed to either side during WW II and who continue to follow somewhat independent roads today. Such countries would be the neutrals such as Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Spain and Turkey. While no guide can hope to anticipate all the possibilities let alone cover them, it can at least-or maybe at best-sensitize reviewers to the areas where improper release of information or records could create or contribute to an adverse foreign reaction that would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policies and relations and thus to our national security. The above comments are intended as a general guide, not as a definitive or all inclusive directive. Individual judgment must be relied upon in most cases. When in doubt refer the question to C/CRG/OPS.

2. When you find foreign government information or documents which fall within the above categories they should be treated as any other document and processed as follows:

- a. Remove from box and replace with a Withdrawal Notice.
- b. Stamp the document with the reviewer's stamp.
- c. Fill in the Withdrawal Notice number and the document number from Job No. 79-00332A.
- d. Mark to indicate any change in classification.
- e. Fill in the year of the "Next Review Date" to indicate a time period of 40 years from the date of the document's creation date (30 years allowed by E.O. 12065 plus 10 years for the first review extension).
- f. Fill in the date of the review action and your employee number.
- g. Complete Form 4023A as usual.



Chief,
Classification Review Group

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Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-005/OSS

1. HANDLING ☐ REPORTS

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2. PROCESSING A FOLDER AS
A SINGLE DOCUMENT

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1. Any ☐ reports found in OSS records which are from the series dated after 1 January 1946 should be removed and destroyed unless they form an attachment to an OSS or SSU document. In the latter case, the entire document will have to be exempted from declassification since the DCI has certified that all ☐ reports dated from 1 January 1946 are exempted from automatic declassification. The notification of this action was made to the Archivist of the United States in a letter from the DCI in October 1978 and subsequently approved by the Archivist.

2. Occasionally you encounter a folder which consists entirely of material so interrelated and interconnecting that each item forms a part of a substantive thread running throughout the file setting forth a series of facts which tell a story. Usually, the content of the folder concerns a single subject, has a beginning and end covering a specific period of time or series of events, and tells a story to which each document contributes (i.e. a case or project, diaries, etc.). When it is necessary to exempt documents from such a folder or which are part of a bound volume* care must be exercised to ensure that the documents removed will not destroy the integrity of the folder and the story it tells. If, in the reviewer's judgment, the number of documents requiring exemption from declassification is so great that the integrity of the folder would be destroyed by their removal, the reviewer may exempt the entire folder and treat it as a single document. In this instance, complete a single 4023A form entering Code 12 for the "Type of Document" on the 4023A form.

3. When a document is removed under such circumstances, it must be replaced by a Withdrawal Notice. The action will be recorded on a 4023A form.

STAT

Chief,
Classification Review Group

* In the case of a bound volume, removal will be by single or multiple full pages only. Removing a part of a page is tantamount to sanitizing a portion of a page and will not be done.

8 May 1979

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-004/OSS

HANDLING DOCUMENT TRANSFER FORMS
AND CROSS-REFERENCE STAMPS

1. In the past many documents were withdrawn from the OSS records and placed in other files. Usually the documents were placed in a 201 file as part of a 201 consolidation action. In these cases, the document was replaced in the OSS records by a Document Transfer Form (a cross-reference sheet). This form briefly identifies the document, identifies the file to which it was transferred, identifies the CIA RID analyst who took the action, and identifies the file in which it was found.

2. The IMS/DDO team [] will remove all Document Transfer Forms and hold them in Job No. 79-0072OR for reference purposes. No reference to such forms or to the documents they replace will remain in OSS records sent to NARS.

3. Should a CRG/ISAS OSS reviewer find a Document Transfer Form in the OSS records, remove it and when a number of them have been collected, send them to the IMS/DDO team []. If, however, the file number has not been written on the document itself, this should be done before returning the document to IMS/DDO [].

4. Some documents have a cover sheet attached which is stamped to indicate that the document is cross-referenced to another file, usually a 201 file. In reviewing that document ignore the stamped cross-reference. If the cover sheet is otherwise destroyable, destroy it.

[]
Chief,
Classification Review Group

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-003/OSS

AGENCY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL NOTICE FORMS
OR CHARGEOUT SHEETS

1. When you encounter an Agency Chargeout Sheet, officially entitled a "Records Center Withdrawal Notice," ignore it.

2. Before the boxes of records are sent to us they will be reviewed by the IMS team and one of the things that team will do is to note which documents are still charged out. They will initiate action to recover the charged out documents and those which they are able to locate and retrieve will be sent to us for classification review before they are returned to the boxes. When we receive such documents for review, handle as follows:

a. When a document can be declassified and released to NARS merely send it back to the IMS team with a note to that effect. They will replace it in the records boxes.

b. When a document must remain classified, handle like any other exempted document: Stamp and mark it accordingly; complete a 4023A form; and, file the document in Job No. 79-00332A. Complete a numbered Withdrawal Notice, attach to it the copy of the Agency "Records Center Withdrawal Notice" which accompanied the document, and return them to the IMS team [] They will be responsible for placing the numbered Withdrawal Notice in the proper records box.

c. When a document is already unclassified or can be declassified and released to NARS but its content includes CI information which should be retained by the Agency, return a copy of the document to the IMS team [] using the archival form 610 provided for this purpose. It will be DDO/IMS/[] responsibility to file the document.

[]

Chief,
Classification Review Group

STAT

24 January 1979

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-002/OSS

Replaces Sections R, S, & V of CRP 78-3/OSS
dated 13 December 1978

COMPLETING FORM 4023A FOR DOCUMENTS FROM PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATIONS

Sections R, S, and V are hereby rescinded. There follow new instructions for the completion of these sections.

a. Section "R" - Document Title

Instead of using the two lines (72 spaces) provided on Form 4023A as previously noted, these two lines will now be used in the following manner:

General:

(1) The first line (36 spaces) will be used to record the withdrawal number of the exempt document and the location in the old file from which the exempt document is being removed. The second line (36 spaces) will be used to record as much of the title of the document as is appropriate or possible.

Specific:

(1) The first six (6) spaces of the first line will be used to record the withdrawal number of the exempt document. Example: withdrawal number 168 will appear on the 4023A form as 000168; the number 10,168 as 010168;

(2) Leave the next space blank;

(3) The next nine (9) spaces are used to write out the old Job Number. The first two (2) spaces are used for the year; the next space will be used either for a dash or for the letter which appears on some old job lots. The next six (6) spaces are for the Job Number. Fill out the Job number as described in para (1) above;

(4) The next eleven (11) spaces will be used to record the geographic area if it is part of the document's identifying number. For example, some job lots are combined field records and will have several groups of boxes (1 to 20 etc.) in which the Box Number will be prefixed by an area identification such as [] etc. The use of the geographic identification will prevent duplicate box and folder numbers appearing in the same job lot. Begin with the first space and write the geographic area in the [] spaces

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Superseded by CRP 79-007/OSS

(5) The next three (3) spaces will be used to record the Box Number. Complete all three spaces using zeros as necessary.

(6) The next three (3) spaces will be used to record the folder from which the exempt document is being removed using zeros as necessary;

(7) The last three (3) spaces on the first line will be used to record the Document Number of the exempt document as it appeared in the old file using zeros as necessary.

(8) The second line (36 spaces) for the document title will be used to record the title of the document. Enter as much of the title as possible exactly as it appears on the document including all punctuation marks, even spelling errors. Do not use any abbreviations unless the abbreviation is present in the document title. Words, or parts of words that cannot be accommodated in the 36 character field will be ignored. The procedure will provide the standardized entries necessary to permit document matching by the computer. Where the title is vague or meaningless you can add an explanation or clarifying remark so long as it fits within the field and such comments must be placed in parentheses. If the document has no title you should describe it briefly, but again place the descriptive comments in parentheses.

b. Section "S" - Review Classification

All reference to and instructions for use of the character "Z" are hereby rescinded. The review classification space on the bottom line will be used to record the classification of the document after you review it. You can retain the original classification or downgrade as appropriate in accordance with classification guidelines in E.O. 12065.

c. Section "V" - Review Coordination

This entire section is rescinded. Reviewers will leave this section blank.



ENTER,
Classification Review Group

STAT

23 January 1979

Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100053-8

Classification Review Group

CRP 79-001/OSS

Rescinds CRP 78-2/OSS, 13 December 1978

PROCEDURES IN HANDLING OSS MATERIAL

1. Ordering Material:

Place orders for OSS material only with [redacted] STAT
[redacted] Order the number of feet of records you want, not by Job or Box Number. [redacted] is responsible for scheduling the material for review. STAT

2. Use of the Withdrawal Notice:

When a document is exempted from declassification it will be pulled from its folder or box. It will be replaced by a pre-numbered Withdrawal Notice. There is no need to fill in the "Date" item or any other item on the Withdrawal Notice. The pulled document must be stamped with the classification review stamp. The number from the pre-printed Withdrawal Notice is to be written on the document in the space provided on the stamp for "Document No." (For complete instructions on how to fill in the classification stamp, see CRP 78-1/OSS, para (4)(D).)

3. Handling Exempted Documents:

Each reviewer will receive a pre-numbered archives box. This box number will appear on the 4023A form in the space provided. The reviewer will assign a folder and document number according to the document's location in the box being filled. The document number should also be entered in the space provided on the document stamp, for example: Document No. 242/1. When the reviewer has filled the box with exempted documents, it should be labeled to show the inclusive Withdrawal Notice numbers and then addressed as follows:

[redacted]

*after the Withdrawal
Notice number,* STAT

Note: Boxes of the documents which are declassified, should be addressed as follows:

[redacted]

STAT

4. Handling Bulky Documents:

It is requested that bulky and hard-to-handle documents, attachments, enclosures or materials be placed in an envelope with the document number noted in the upper right hand corner of the envelope before placing them in the records box.

5. See also CRP 79-002/OSS for revised instructions in completing the 4023A form.



Chief,
Classification Review Group

STAT

13 December 1978

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 78-3/OSS

COMPLETING FORM 4023A FOR DOCUMENTS FROM
PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATIONS


The following procedure is for completing Form 4023A on CIA predecessor organization documents. A Form 4023A will be completed only on those documents which are exempted from automatic declassification. This will include documents from COI, OSS, SSU, CIG and other U.S. Government agency documents which contain information from predecessor organizations which must be exempted. No Form 4023A will be filled out on documents which are declassified or on foreign government documents which do not contain information on sources and methods requiring continued protection. The following explanations are keyed to the items as they appear on the Form 4023A:

- A. Project Number: Leave blank.
- B. Review Date: Enter today's date.
- C. Reviewer Number: Use your assigned reviewer number.
- D. Record Group: Leave blank.
- E. Entry: Leave blank.
- F. Type of Entry: Check "NEW".
- G. Job Number: Use 79-00332A.
- H. Box Number: Use the box number as given to you by the Administrative Officer.
- I. Folder Number: Use the number you assign to each folder as you fill a box.
- J. Document Number: Use the number you assign each document as you fill a folder.
- K. Creation Date: Take from the document. Do not guess but if at least the month and year can be determined, enter them as follows: 001144 (November 1944). Of course, if the day is given, include it. If at least the month and year are not available, leave this entry blank; DO NOT insert zeros.
- L. Originating Component: Use "777." (This number identifies OSS or predecessor organization documents).

*Superseded by
CRP 79-007/OSS*

- M. Document Identification Number: Take from the document. If there is more than one number take the number which you can assume with reasonable certainty is the original number on the document. If you cannot make such a determination, leave this entry blank.
- N. Office of Primary Interest (OPI): Use "53" on all documents.
- O. Type of Document: Use the appropriate code from the print-out instructions.
- P. Original Classification: Take from the document.
- Q. Number of Pages: Self explanatory.
- R. Document Title: Enter the title exactly as it appears on the document including all punctuation marks, even spelling errors. Do not use any abbreviations unless the abbreviation is present in the document title. Words, or parts of words that cannot be accommodated in the 72-character field will be ignored. This procedure will provide the standardized entries necessary to permit document matching by the computer. Where a title is vague or meaningless you can add an explanation or clarifying remark so long as it fits within the field and you place the comments in parentheses. If the document has no title you should describe it briefly, but again place the descriptive comments in parentheses.
- S. Review Classification: The classification of the document after your review of it. Use the character "Z" if it is the document of another U.S. Government agency containing OSS information requiring continued protection or a foreign government document containing information on sources and methods requiring continued protection. (See Section V below).
- T. Retention Justification: Use the appropriate code from the new instructions responsive to E.O. 12065.
- U. Next Review Date: Enter 10.
- V. Review Coordination: Entries in this item indicate that another U.S. Government agency, or a foreign government must be contacted and asked to coordinate before the document can be declassified or it contains information on sources and methods requiring continued protection. Normally this will be used when you have a foreign government document, or a document from another U.S. Government agency which contains information CIA is responsible for and which cannot be released. (See also CRP 78-2/OSS). Enter a "Z" and identify originating agency or foreign government.

STAT


Chief, Classification Review Group

13 December 1978

Classification Review Procedure

CRP 78-2/OSS

PROCEDURES IN HANDLING OSS MATERIAL

1. Ordering Material:

Place orders for OSS material only with [redacted]
[redacted] Order the number of feet of records
you want, not by job or box number. [redacted] is responsible for
scheduling the material for review.

STAT

STAT

2. Use of the Withdrawal Notice:

When a document is exempted from declassification it will be pulled from its folder or box. It will be replaced by a pre-numbered Withdrawal Notice. On the Withdrawal Notice fill in the Job No., Box No., and the Folder No. from the document. There is no need to fill in the "Date" item on the Withdrawal Notice. The pulled document must be stamped with the classification review stamp. The number from the pre-printed Withdrawal Notice is to be written on the document in the space provided on the stamp for "Document No." (For complete instruction on how to fill in stamp see CRP 78-1/OSS, para (4)(D).)

After stamping exempted documents and completing a form 4023A on each, place them numerically in a records center box. When the box is filled, send it [redacted] addressed as follows:

STAT

3. Handling Bulky Documents:

It is requested that bulky and hard-to-handle documents, attachments, enclosures or materials be placed in an envelope with the document number noted in the upper right hand corner of the envelope, before placing them in the records box.

STAT

[redacted]
Chief, Classification Review Group

13 December 1978

Classification Review Procedure

CRP 78-1/OSS

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR OSS AND SSU RECORDS

The following procedures are for use in the classification review of OSS and SSU records. While exceptions and variations will undoubtedly be encountered, this guidance is meant to be generally applicable and to cover the great majority of records to be reviewed..

(1) Procedure for:

- A. OSS documents which can be declassified;
- B. SSU documents which can be declassified:

Take no action when a box contains only such documents; mark outside of box to effect that entire collection can be declassified.

(2) Procedure for:

- A. Foreign government documents the substance of which contains no classified information;
- B. Other U.S. agency documents which contain no OSS or SSU information.
- C. Other U.S. agency documents which contain OSS or SSU information which can be declassified; tab with paper strips, leave in the box.

(3) Procedure for:

- A. OSS documents which must remain classified;
- B. SSU documents which must remain classified;
- C. Foreign government documents which contain classified information concerning intelligence sources and methods sufficiently sensitive that we should continue to protect it;
- D. Other U.S. agency documents which contain OSS or SSU information which must remain classified;

Physically remove the document from the file and replace it with the pre-printed form provided for the purpose. Stamp the document on the first page with the classification review stamp:

Fill in the number of the document taken from the pre-printed insert, indicate the classification action you take, note the next review date, your reviewer number, and the date. Complete a 4023A form for the document. Place the document removed from the file in the special job lot, Job No. 79-00332A, which will be forwarded to and held as a separate classified unit being retained by CIA.

Chief,
Classification Review Group

STAT